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Expanding the Deck v. Missouri Rule 
to Nonjury Proceedings 
 
Courts in the United States have traditionally held that criminal 
defendants have the right to be free from unwarranted restraints visible 
to the jury during the guilt phase of a trial. The term “unwarranted 
restraints” refers to the use of restraints on a defendant absent a court’s 
individualized determination that such restraints are justified by an 
essential state interest. In Deck v. Missouri, the Supreme Court 
expanded the prohibition against unwarranted restraints to the 
sentencing phase of a trial. The law regarding the unwarranted 
shackling of defendants in nonjury proceedings, however, remains 
unsettled. The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second and Eleventh 
Circuits have held that courts may validly use restraints on defendants 
in nonjury proceedings absent a showing of individualized need. 
Conversely, the Ninth Circuit has determined that the holding in Deck 
extends to nonjury proceedings, and therefore defendants have a right to 
be free from unwarranted shackles in jury and nonjury proceedings. 
This Note advocates for the Ninth Circuit’s approach and argues that 
the Supreme Court should expand the rule established in Deck to 
nonjury proceedings. Unwarranted restraints violate criminal 
defendants’ due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments regardless of the presence of a jury. This Note then 
proposes factors for courts to use in conducting individualized shackling 
determinations and offers further recommendations for implementation 
of the Deck rule to all court proceedings—jury and nonjury. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Fifty years ago, Bobby Seale, the cofounder of the Black Panther 
Party, was charged in Chicago with conspiring to cross state lines with 
the intent to cause riots.1 His arrest occurred in connection with the 
1968 Democratic National Convention,2 and at his heated, racially 
charged trial, Seale called the presiding judge a “pig” and a “fascist.”3 
In response, the judge ordered Seale bound and silenced.4 “Seale, trying 
to scream through [a] gag, was then carried into the courtroom” tied to 
 
 1. Bob Greene, A Courtroom Circus?, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 11, 1995), https://www.chicago 
tribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1995-10-11-9510110064-story.html [https://perma.cc/XGA7-UVEV]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. See Judge Julius J. Hoffman, 87, Dies: President at Trial of the Chicago 7, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 2, 1983), https://www.nytimes.com/1983/07/02/obituaries/judge-julius-j-hoffman-87-dies-
president-at-trial-of-the-chicago-7.html [https://perma.cc/V46J-UJN9] (stating that Seale called 
Federal District Judge Julius J. Hoffman, the judge presiding over Seale’s trial, a “pig” and a 
“fascist”). See generally Greene, supra note 1 (explaining that tensions escalated between Seale 
and the judge when Seale demanded the right to defend himself during trial, instead of using the 
attorney of record, and the judge refused). 
 4. Greene, supra note 1.  
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a wooden chair as the jury looked on at the spectacle.5 And when the 
judge could still faintly hear Seale through the gag, he ordered it 
tightened.6 
Of course, judges do not habitually gag and chain defendants to 
wooden chairs.7 But the Seale case demonstrates the prejudice that can 
result from the use of restraints in a courtroom. If a criminal defendant 
enters a courtroom shackled and gagged, those present in the courtroom 
may perceive the defendant as dangerous and threatening. 
Furthermore, restraints may signify that the defendant needs to be 
forcibly separated from the rest of society. These perceptions can taint 
the justice system with prejudice against defendants. 
Undoubtedly, courts sometimes need to restrain particular 
defendants for the safety of themselves and others in the courtroom. 
But certain courts in the United States have outfitted all defendants in 
full restraints as a routine and indiscriminate policy for nonjury 
courtroom proceedings.8 “Full restraints” require defendants to wear 
tight handcuffs connected to a heavy chain wrapped around their waist 
with their feet shackled and chained together. When a court utilizes an 
indiscriminate shackling policy, the court requires defendants to wear 
full restraints regardless of perceived need or “a defendant’s individual 
characteristics.”9 Thus, while such a policy ensures that defendants who 
do pose a threat are effectively restrained, it also results in the 
shackling of defendants who are disabled, seriously ill, or injured.10 
 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. While scenes as dramatic as that in the Seale trial occur very rarely, defendants are often 
gagged or otherwise shackled in a shocking manner. Id.; see State v. Brewer, 301 So. 2d 630, 636 
(La. 1974) (holding that it was not abuse of discretion for the trial judge to order that one of the 
defendant’s hands be tied behind his back and his mouth be “taped”); State v. Forrest, 609 S.E.2d 
241, 246 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (“[T]he trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring that 
defendant be secured to his chair, handcuffed, and masked during his trial.”); Terry A. Maroney, 
Angry Judges, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1239–40 (2012) (citing Shaw v. State, 846 S.W.2d 482, 485–
86 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)) (describing how a judge had a defendant “bound and gagged” for 
speaking out of turn). 
 8. See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d 649, 653 (9th Cir. 2017) (stating that 
the Southern District of California implemented a district-wide policy of allowing the U.S. 
Marshals Service to produce all in-custody defendants in full restraints for most nonjury 
proceedings), vacated as moot, 138 S. Ct. 1532 (2018); Alaska Pretrial Detainees for End of 
Unwarranted Courtroom Shackling v. Johnson, No. 3:17-CV-00226-SLG, 2018 WL 2144345, at *1 
(D. Alaska May 9, 2018) (describing that state courts in Alaska, as a policy, require that pretrial 
detainees be shackled together in a “human chain’” before entering the courtroom). 
 9. See, e.g., Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d at 654. 
 10. Id. (stating that full restraints were used on a defendant with a fractured wrist, a 
defendant with a vision impairment, and a defendant brought to court in a wheelchair who had 
serious and worsening health issues). 
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The U.S. Supreme Court first directly adjudicated the 
constitutionality of shackling defendants in Deck v. Missouri.11 In Deck, 
the Court prohibited the use of visible shackles during the sentencing 
phase of a trial, except when the use of restraints could be “justified by 
an essential state interest.”12 Courts had traditionally held that 
defendants have the right to be free from unwarranted restraints 
visible to the jury during the guilt phase of a trial, but Deck marked the 
first time that the Supreme Court explicitly expanded that recognized 
right to the sentencing phase.13 The term “unwarranted restraints” 
refers to the use of restraints on a defendant without a trial court’s 
determination that such restraints are justified by a state interest 
specific to the particular defendant.14 The law regarding the 
indiscriminate shackling of defendants in nonjury proceedings remains 
unsettled, however, and the circuit courts disagree on whether Deck 
applies to such cases.15 
This Note examines the Supreme Court’s opinion in Deck v. 
Missouri and comments on whether it applies to nonjury courtroom 
proceedings. Specifically, this Note analyzes whether the rule 
established in Deck, which prohibits indiscriminate shackling in the 
sentencing phase of trial, should be expanded to prohibit the use of 
indiscriminate shackling in all phases of trial—regardless of the 
presence of a jury. 
Part I explains the history of shackling and restraining 
defendants, and details the Deck v. Missouri decision. Part II 
articulates the legal principles the Supreme Court relied on in Deck and 
analyzes how these principles fit within the context of nonjury 
proceedings. Part II additionally considers the circuit split that has 
arisen over the application of Deck to nonjury proceedings. Finally, Part 
III proposes that the Supreme Court expand the rule established in 
Deck to nonjury proceedings and argues that the unwarranted use of 
 
 11. 544 U.S. 622 (2005). 
 12. Id. at 624 (quoting Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568–69 (1986)). 
 13. See id. at 628: 
Courts and commentators share close to a consensus that, during the guilt phase of a 
trial, a criminal defendant has a right to remain free of physical restraints that are 
visible to the jury; that the right has a constitutional dimension; but that the right may 
be overcome in a particular instance by essential state interests such as physical 
security, escape prevention, or courtroom decorum. 
 14. Id. at 629. 
 15. See Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d at 666 (holding that the rule established in Deck applies to 
nonjury proceedings as well); United States v. LaFond, 783 F.3d 1216, 1225 (11th Cir. 2015) 
(holding that the Constitution does not prohibit the shackling of a defendant during a sentencing 
hearing before a judge); United States v. Zuber, 118 F.3d 101, 104 (2d Cir. 1997) (“We decline to 
extend the rule . . . requiring an independent, judicial evaluation of the need to restrain a party in 
court—to the context of non-jury sentencing proceedings.”). 
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restraints in nonjury proceedings violates defendants’ due process 
rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Part III then 
proposes factors to be used in conducting individualized shackling 
determinations and provides further recommendations for 
implementing the Deck rule.  
I. BACKGROUND 
The use of restraints in the courtroom is a longstanding practice. 
Courts have grappled with questions of how and when defendants 
should be shackled in court proceedings for longer than the United 
States has existed. This Part will discuss the legal background on 
shackling defendants by analyzing English common law and American 
case law. It will focus specifically on three U.S. Supreme Court cases 
that mention the use of shackles on defendants: (1) Illinois v. Allen,16 
(2) Estelle v. Williams,17 and (3) Holbrook v. Flynn.18 It will then discuss 
the factual and procedural background of Deck v. Missouri.19 
A. English Common Law Background 
The practice of restraining defendants has deep roots in the 
common law. According to William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the 
Laws of England, under English common law, a court could not shackle 
or otherwise restrain a defendant unless there was a clear risk that the 
defendant would attempt to escape.20 After describing this general 
prohibition, Blackstone noted the example of “Layer’s Case,” where a 
defendant with a prior escape attempt was shackled during 
arraignment. In Layer’s Case, the court distinguished between the use 
of shackles at the “time of arraignment” and at the “time of trial,” 
implying that shackles are less injurious during arraignment.21 
Blackstone does not present Layer’s Case to support a general rule 
 
 16. 397 U.S. 337 (1970). 
 17. 425 U.S. 501 (1976). 
 18. 475 U.S. 560 (1986). 
 19. 544 U.S. 622 (2005). 
 20. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *317 (1769) (“[I]t is 
laid down in our ancient books, that, though under an indictment of the highest nature, [a 
defendant] must be brought to the bar without irons, or any manner of shackles or bonds; unless 
there be evident danger of an escape.” (footnote omitted)); see also 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF 
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 34 (1797) (“If felons come in judgement to answer . . . they shall be out of 
irons, and all manner of bonds, so that their pain shall not take away any manner of reason, nor 
them constrain to answer, but at their free will.”). 
 21. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, at 317; see also Deck, 544 U.S. at 626 (citing Layer’s Case); 
Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d at 663 (citing Layer’s Case). 
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allowing restraints during arraignment hearings, however.22 Instead, 
Layer’s Case can be read as an exception to the general ban on 
shackling in the courtroom.23 In Layer’s Case, the defendant’s prior 
attempt at escape revealed an individualized need for restraints during 
the arraignment hearing.24 Layer’s Case therefore demonstrates that 
shackling defendants at arraignment was “not a standard practice, or 
even permissible, absent a demonstrated need.”25 
While limited information exists to explain the prohibition 
against shackling in English common law, commentators have 
hypothesized that the rule was introduced to serve multiple purposes: 
to guarantee defendants a fair trial; to prevent punishing defendants 
before they receive a conviction; to allow defendants to meaningfully 
engage in their own defense without the distraction of wearing 
shackles; to prevent defendants from suffering excessive pain from 
heavy, uncomfortable shackles; and to maintain the dignity and 
decorum of the courtroom.26 
B. American Case Law Background 
The English common law rule on shackling defendants in the 
courtroom has had lasting significance. Indeed, American courts have 
largely adopted Blackstone’s legal principles.27 The first reported case 
in the United States on physically restraining defendants was People v. 
Harrington28 in 1871.29 In Harrington, the California Supreme Court 
embraced the English common law rule and restricted the ability of the 
court to shackle criminal defendants during trial proceedings.30 
 
 22. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, at 317. 
 23. Id. 
      24.    Id. 
      25.    Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d at 663. 
 26. Tara J. Mondelli, Note, Deck v. Missouri: Assessing the Shackling of Defendants During 
the Penalty Phase of Trials, 15 WIDENER L.J. 785, 786 (2006) (citing David E. Westman, Note, 
Handling the Problem Criminal Defendant in the Courtroom: The Use of Physical Restraints and 
Expulsion in the Modern Era, 2 SAN DIEGO JUST. J. 507, 509–10 (1994)). 
 27. See Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 629 (2005) (adopting the limitations on shackling 
promulgated by Blackstone by declaring that the Constitution “prohibit[s] physical restraints 
visible to the jury absent a trial court determination . . . that [restraints] are justified by a state 
interest specific to a particular trial,” and extending the rule against visible restraints to the 
sentencing phase of a trial); 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, at 317. 
 28. 42 Cal. 165 (1871). 
 29. See Deck, 544 U.S. at 643 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that Harrington was the first 
case in the United States to enforce the English common law rule against shackling defendants 
(citing State v. Smith, 8 P. 343 (Or. 1883))). 
 30. Harrington, 42 Cal. at 168–69 (“[T]o require a prisoner during the progress of his trial 
before the Court and jury to appear and remain with chains and shackles upon his limbs, without 
evident necessity for such restraint . . . is a direct violation of the common law rule . . . .”). 
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Harrington emphasized the prejudicial aspect of restraints and held 
that the use of restraints is prohibited when “such physical bonds and 
restraints . . . materially impair and prejudicially affect [the 
defendant’s] statutory privilege of becoming a competent witness and 
testifying in his own behalf.”31 Other states addressed the issue shortly 
after Harrington but disagreed over the proper level of discretion to 
accord the court in making restraint determinations.32 Despite the 
minor divergences, however, the states shared a “general preference 
that defendants be brought to trial without shackles.”33 
The Supreme Court eventually weighed in on the issue in three 
important cases: (1) Illinois v. Allen,34 (2) Estelle v. Williams,35 and (3) 
Holbrook v. Flynn.36 Although the discussions on defendant restraints 
were dicta in all three cases, they nevertheless provide an important 
glimpse into the Supreme Court’s approach toward the constitutionality 
of shackling. Furthermore, the Court relied heavily on Allen, Estelle, 
and Holbrook in deciding Deck v. Missouri.37 
1. Illinois v. Allen 
In 1970, the Supreme Court decided Illinois v. Allen, which 
affirmed the general prohibition against the use of restraints during 
trial. The Court’s decision was notable for its emphasis on the injurious 
effects of shackling.38 The Court acknowledged, however, that such a 
 
 31. Id. at 168. 
 32. Justice Thomas’s Deck dissent provides a thorough overview of the divergence among the 
states in regard to the deference given to judges for restraint decisions. Deck, 544 U.S. at 643–45 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). He states that in the earliest cases on the issue, in the late 1800s, New 
Mexico, Alabama, and Mississippi gave courts wide latitude to determine if a defendant needed to 
be restrained. Id. at 643–44; see, e.g., Faire v. State, 58 Ala. 74, 80–81 (1877); Lee v. State, 51 Miss. 
566, 574 (1875); Territory v. Kelly, 2 N.M. 292, 304–06 (1882). “California, Missouri, Washington, 
and Oregon adopted more restrictive approaches,” however, and imposed rules that limited the 
ability to shackle criminal defendants, while Texas adopted an “intermediate” approach. Deck, 544 
U.S. at 644–45; see, e.g., Harrington, 42 Cal. at 168–69; State v. Kring, 64 Mo. 591, 593 (1877); 
Smith, 8 P. at 343; Rainey v. State, 20 Tex. Ct. App. 455, 472 (1886); State v. Williams, 50 P. 580, 
581–82 (Wash. 1897). 
 33. Deck, 544 U.S. at 645 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 34. 397 U.S. 337 (1970). 
 35. 425 U.S. 501 (1976). 
 36. 475 U.S. 560 (1986); see Deck, 544 U.S. at 649 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (declaring that the 
decisions in Allen, Estelle, and Holbrook shaped modern American case law on shackling). 
 37. Deck, 544 U.S. at 650. 
 38. Allen, 397 U.S. at 344: 
Not only is it possible that the sight of shackles and gags might have a significant effect 
on the jury’s feelings about the defendant, but the use of this technique is itself 
something of an affront to the very dignity and decorum of judicial proceedings that the 
judge is seeking to uphold. Moreover, one of the defendant’s primary advantages of 
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prohibition is not absolute. In Allen, the defendant threatened others in 
the courtroom,39 ripped documents, and exhibited increasingly 
aggressive behavior.40 In these circumstances, the Court indicated that 
the judge had the right to take action to control the defendant.41 The 
Court listed three methods trial judges could employ to handle 
disorderly or violent defendants, one of which involved restraining the 
defendant.42 In fact, the Court stated that “in some 
situations . . . binding and gagging might possibly be the fairest and 
most reasonable way to handle” an uncontrollable defendant.43 
Nevertheless, the Court in Allen expressed significant concerns 
about the negative effects of shackling. The Court cautioned that “no 
person should be tried while shackled and gagged except as a last 
resort.”44 Furthermore, the Court stressed that the use of physical 
restraints causes prejudice to the defendant because it significantly 
affects the jury’s feelings, impairs the defendant’s ability to participate 
in the trial, and offends the “dignity and decorum” of the courtroom.45 
In short, Allen stated that judges may use restraints in the courtroom 
if the situation warrants such a response but warned in dicta that these 
measures should not be used flippantly.46 
2. Estelle v. Williams 
Six years after Allen, the Supreme Court again confronted the 
shackling issue in Estelle v. Williams.47 In Estelle, the defendant was 
forced to remain in prison clothing during his trial, and after the 
conclusion of his trial he argued that appearing before a jury in prison 
attire was inherently unfair.48 The Court noted that unlike the use of 
physical restraints, which serves the purpose of controlling a disruptive 
 
being present at the trial, his ability to communicate with his counsel, is greatly reduced 
when the defendant is in a condition of total physical restraint. 
 39. Id. at 340 (explaining that the defendant threatened that the judge would be a “corpse” 
by the time the defendant went to lunch). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 343–44. 
 42. Id. (“We think there are at least three constitutionally permissible ways for a trial judge 
to handle an obstreperous defendant like Allen: (1) bind and gag him, thereby keeping him present; 
(2) cite him for contempt; (3) take him out of the courtroom until he promises to conduct himself 
properly.”). 
 43. Id. at 344. 
 44. Id.  
 45. Id. 
 46. Id.  
 47. 425 U.S. 501 (1976). 
 48. Id. at 502–03. 
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defendant and maintaining order in the courtroom,49 forcing a 
defendant to remain in prison clothing during trial does not further an 
essential state interest.50 Noting the prejudicial effect of prison garb, 
the Court stated that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the state 
from compelling a defendant to wear prison attire during a jury trial.51 
The Court, however, held that the defendant’s failure to object to his 
attire at trial negated the presence of compulsion, which was necessary 
to establish a constitutional violation.52 Because the defendant did not 
object, the Court held that the State did not violate the defendant’s 
constitutional right to wear alternative clothing.53 
In dissent, Justice William J. Brennan Jr. critiqued the majority 
for “imput[ing] the effect of waiver” to the failure of the defendant to 
object to the prison attire.54 He argued that the defendant in Estelle had 
not “knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently consented to be tried in” 
the prison garb.55 Furthermore, he stressed that criminal defendants 
are entitled to a presumption of innocence, and when defendants wear 
prison clothing during a trial, they are “rob[bed]” of that presumption.56 
Justice Brennan additionally argued that requiring a defendant to wear 
prison clothing “surely tends to brand him in the eyes of the jurors with 
an unmistakable mark of guilt.”57 He wrote that due process rights do 
not tolerate even a minimal risk that the defendant’s prison outfit could 
influence a juror and erode the defendant’s right to a presumption of 
innocence.58 
 
 49. See Allen, 397 U.S. at 343 (stating that trial judges need discretion to take action, 
including shackling and gagging a defendant, to maintain the “dignity, order, and decorum” of the 
courtroom). 
 50. Estelle, 425 U.S. at 505 (“[C]ompelling an accused to wear jail clothing furthers no 
essential state policy.”). 
 51. Id. at 504–05, 512.  
 52. Id. at 512–13 (declaring that “the State cannot, consistently with the Fourteenth 
Amendment, compel an accused to stand trial before a jury while dressed in identifiable prison 
clothes,” but holding that here, because the defendant had not objected, there was no constitutional 
violation).  
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. at 515–16 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that “respondent’s trial in identifiable 
prison garb constituted a denial of due process of law” and “present[ed] the possibility of an 
unjustified verdict of guilt”). 
 55. Id. at 516. 
 56. Id. at 518. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id.; see Brandon Dickerson, Note, Bidding Farewell to the Ball and Chain: The United 
States Supreme Court Unconvincingly Prohibits Shackling in the Penalty Phase in Deck v. 
Missouri, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 741, 764–65 (2006) (summarizing Justice Brennan’s opinion). 
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3. Holbrook v. Flynn 
In 1986, a decade after Estelle v. Williams, the Supreme Court 
decided Holbrook v. Flynn.59 In Holbrook, four uniformed state troopers 
sat in the front row of the spectator section of the courtroom during the 
guilt phase of the defendant’s jury trial.60 The courtroom’s normal 
security force did not include troopers,61 but the court used them for 
supplemental security specifically for the defendant’s trial.62 The court 
used additional security measures because the defendant “had been 
denied bail after an individualized determination” that the State could 
not otherwise ensure his presence at trial.63 The defendant claimed that 
the presence of the uniformed guards would likely influence the jury by 
suggesting that the defendant was of bad character. The Supreme Court 
disagreed, however, holding that the “conspicuous” presence of 
additional uniformed officers at the trial was not inherently prejudicial 
and thus did not deprive the defendant of his constitutional right to a 
fair and unbiased trial.64 
The Court arrived at its conclusion by comparing the prejudicial 
effects of the uniformed state troopers’ presence at trial with the 
prejudicial effects of physical restraints and prison clothing.65 The 
Court stated that shackles and prison attire are clear indications that 
the defendant needs to be controlled and separated from the public, 
which may result in improper juror bias against the defendant.66 
Conversely, however, the Court noted that jurors would not necessarily 
interpret the guards as a sign that the defendant is dangerous.67 
Instead, there are a “wider range of inferences that a juror might 
reasonably draw from the officers’ presence.”68 For example, a juror may 
interpret the presence of officers as protection against disturbances 
from outside the courtroom, or simply as a routine element of a criminal 
proceeding.69 The presence of officers should, therefore, be 
 
 59. 475 U.S. 560 (1986). 
 60. Id. at 562. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 571. 
 64. See id. at 569 (“ ‘[R]eason, principle, and common human experience’ counsel against a 
presumption that any use of identifiable security guards in the courtroom is inherently 
prejudicial.” (quoting Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504 (1976))). 
 65. Id. at 569. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See id. at 569, 571 (“Four troopers are unlikely to have been taken as a sign of anything 
other than a normal official concern for the safety and order of the proceedings.”). 
       69.   Id. 
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distinguished from shackling and prison clothing.70 The Court 
accordingly held that the defendant’s constitutional due process rights 
had not been violated.71 
C. Deck v. Missouri 
After Holbrook, the Supreme Court did not encounter another 
shackling case until Deck v. Missouri in 2005. In Deck, the Court held 
that the Due Process Clause prohibits the use of visible shackles during 
the sentencing phase of a criminal proceeding, except when an essential 
state interest, specific to a particular defendant, requires the use of 
restraints.72 Deck therefore expanded the generally accepted rule 
prohibiting indiscriminate shackling during the guilt phase of trial to 
the sentencing phase of trial, thereby increasing the recognized rights 
of criminal defendants.73 
1. Factual Background of Deck v. Missouri 
On July 8, 1996, Carman Deck drove to rural Jefferson County, 
Missouri, to rob James and Zelma Long, an elderly couple that he had 
been surveilling.74 He knew the Longs’ grandson and had previously 
accompanied the grandson to break into a safe that the Longs kept in 
their home.75 When Deck arrived at the Longs’ house with a plan to rob 
the safe, he knocked on their door under the guise of needing directions 
to a nearby town.76 Mrs. Long invited Deck inside their home, and soon 
after, Deck pulled a pistol from his waistband and demanded that the 
Longs enter their bedroom and open the safe.77 Deck then instructed 
the Longs to lie face down on the bed, where he debated whether or not 
to kill them for approximately ten minutes before ultimately killing 
both James and Zelma with the pistol.78 Deck then fled the scene and 
 
 70. Id. at 569. But see Estelle, 425 U.S. at 508 (noting that although prison garb may prejudice 
the jury against a defendant, producing a defendant in prison attire can also be used as a “defense 
tactic” to elicit sympathy from the jurors). 
 71. See Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 569–72.  
 72. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 632 (2005). 
 73. Id. 
 74. State v. Deck (Deck I), 994 S.W.2d 527, 531 (Mo. 1999). 
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 531–32. 
 78. Id.  
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returned home before he was arrested that evening.79 Later, he fully 
confessed to the robbery and murders of James and Zelda Long.80 
2. Procedural Background of Deck v. Missouri 
The Circuit Court of Jefferson County convicted Deck of first-
degree murder and related offenses before sentencing him to death.81 
State authorities required that Deck wear leg braces throughout his 
trial, but the braces were not visible to the jury.82 On direct appeal, the 
Supreme Court of Missouri upheld the conviction.83 
Deck then argued that he was denied effective assistance of 
counsel and petitioned the Supreme Court of Missouri for post-
conviction relief.84 The court agreed that he was denied effective 
assistance of counsel and remanded for a new penalty phase.85 At retrial 
of the penalty phase, Deck was forced to “appear before the jury wearing 
leg irons and handcuffed to a belly chain.”86 The restraints at the retrial, 
unlike the leg braces worn during the original trial, were clearly visible 
to the jurors.87 Deck’s counsel objected to the physical restraints before 
voir dire commenced, but the court overruled the objection.88 Deck’s 
counsel renewed the objection during voir dire, and again the court 
overruled the objection.89 Then, after voir dire, Deck’s counsel again 
objected to the shackling.90 Deck’s counsel moved to strike the jury 
panel, arguing that the jury would perceive Deck as violent after 
witnessing him in leg irons and a belly chain.91 Again, the court 
overruled the defense’s objection, and the penalty phase of the trial 
 
 79. Id. at 532. A police officer, tipped off by an informant, searched Deck’s car and found a 
pistol hidden under the front seat. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 624 (2005). 
 83. Deck I, 994 S.W.2d at 531. 
 84. Deck v. State (Deck II), 68 S.W.3d 418, 422 (Mo. 2002). 
 85. The Supreme Court of Missouri found that Deck had been denied effective assistance of 
counsel because Deck’s counsel had failed to recommend proper mitigation instructions to the 
court. Id. at 431–32. 
 86. State v. Deck (Deck III), 136 S.W.3d 481, 485 (Mo. 2004). 
 87. Compare id. (noting that at the retrial, Deck “appear[ed] before the jury” wearing 
restraints), with Deck, 544 U.S. at 624 (noting that Deck’s leg braces were not visible to the jury 
at the original trial). 
 88. Deck, 544 U.S. at 625. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
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commenced with Deck outfitted in restraints.92 Deck was, once again, 
sentenced to death.93 
After the resentencing, Deck appealed, citing nine points of 
error.94 Among other points, Deck argued that the trial court abused its 
discretion when it forced Deck to appear shackled before the jury during 
the retrial of the penalty phase.95 Deck claimed the restraints violated 
his constitutional right to “due process, equal protection, confrontation 
of the evidence, a fair and reliable sentencing and freedom from cruel 
and unusual punishment.”96 
The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the trial court acted 
within its discretion in deciding to shackle Deck throughout the trial, 
including the retrial of the penalty phase.97 In rejecting Deck’s 
argument, the Supreme Court of Missouri declared that (1) there was 
no record of the jury’s awareness of the shackles, (2) Deck was not 
prevented from participating in the proceeding due to the shackles, and 
(3) Deck posed a flight risk because he was a repeat offender who had 
“killed his two victims to avoid being returned to custody.”98 
Additionally, the court held that Deck failed to demonstrate that the 
shackles prejudiced the outcome of his proceeding.99 Thus, the death 
sentence was affirmed.100 
Deck submitted a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court to 
consider whether the Circuit Court of Jefferson County violated Deck’s 
constitutional rights by forcing him to appear in shackles during the 
retrial of his sentencing hearing.101 Specifically, the issue was whether 
the visible shackles violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment 
guarantees that no person shall be deprived “of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.”102 The Supreme Court reversed the 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. Deck III, 136 S.W.3d 481, 484 (Mo. 2004). 
 94. Id. Deck, in addition to arguing against the use of physical restraints, argued against the 
admission of a double hearsay statement; the submission of certain sentencing guidelines to the 
jury; the trial court’s failure to provide shortened jury recess instructions; the court’s admission of 
certain victim-impact evidence and family testimony; a specific portion of the State’s closing 
argument to the jury; the exclusion of venire members from the jury; the court’s imposition of the 
death penalty; and the court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the case. Id. at 484–90. 
 95. Id. at 485. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See id. (“Neither being viewed in shackles by the venire panel prior to trial, nor being 
viewed while restrained throughout the entire trial, alone, is proof of prejudice.”). 
 100. Id. at 490. 
  101. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005) (No. 04-5293), 
2004 WL 2338088, at *1. 
 102. Deck, 544 U.S. at 624, 627; see U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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Supreme Court of Missouri and extended the constitutional prohibition 
against visible shackles during the guilt phase of trial to the penalty 
phase of trial.103 Specifically, the Court held that the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibits the use of 
visible shackles during the penalty phase unless an essential state 
interest that is “specific to the defendant on trial” justifies use of the 
shackles.104 
In deciding to extend protection to the penalty phase of the trial, 
the Supreme Court relied on the English common law background on 
shackling and addressed the deep common law roots against 
unwarranted shackling.105 The Court also relied on three fundamental 
legal principles in deciding to expand the prohibition against 
unwarranted shackles to the sentencing phase of trial: (1) the 
presumption of innocence until proven guilty; (2) the right to secure a 
meaningful defense; and (3) maintaining the “dignity and decorum” of 
the courtroom and the judicial process.106 These principles are largely 
generated from the Court’s analysis of dicta from its prior decisions 
about shackling, specifically Allen,107 Estelle,108 and Holbrook.109 
II. ANALYSIS 
In Deck, the Supreme Court expanded the ban on unwarranted 
shackling specifically to the penalty phase of trial; it did not extend such 
protections any further.110 The Deck Court did include brief dictum111 
noting that the common law prohibition against shackles did not apply 
to nonjury proceedings.112 But, because Deck focused on shackles at the 
 
 103. Deck, 544 U.S. at 623–24. 
 104. Id. at 624 (“We hold that the Constitution forbids the use of visible shackles during the 
penalty phase, as it forbids their use during the guilt phase, unless that use is ‘justified by an 
essential state interest’—such as the interest in courtroom security—specific to the defendant on 
trial.” (quoting Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 569 (1986))). 
 105. See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text. 
 106. Deck, 544 U.S. at 630–32 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970) for the third 
fundamental legal principle). 
 107. 397 U.S. 337. 
 108. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976). 
 109. 475 U.S. 560. 
 110. The Supreme Court narrowly tailored the holding in Deck by explicitly limiting the 
established rule to the penalty phase of trial. Deck, 544 U.S. at 633 (“[W]e must conclude that 
courts cannot routinely place defendants in shackles or other physical restraints visible to the jury 
during the penalty phase of a capital proceeding.”).  
 111. See Deck, 544 U.S. at 626; United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d 649, 663 (9th Cir. 
2017) (“[A] statement on pretrial proceedings is undoubtedly dictum in a case about shackling at 
capital sentencing.”), vacated as moot, 138 S. Ct. 1532 (2018). 
 112. See Deck, 544 U.S. at 626 (“Blackstone and other English authorities recognized that the 
rule did not apply at ‘the time of arraignment,’ or like proceedings before the judge.” (quoting 4 
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sentencing phase of trial and did not directly address shackles in 
nonjury proceedings, the language does not preclude the Court from 
expanding the rule prohibiting unwarranted shackling further. The 
question regarding the constitutionality of shackling nonjury 
defendants remains open. 
This Part will analyze the Supreme Court’s opinion in Deck and 
apply its reasoning to nonjury proceedings. Specifically, it will consider 
how the Deck Court relied on English common law background and 
legal principles extrapolated from U.S. case law and apply such 
reasoning to nonjury proceedings. It will then discuss the circuit split 
concerning whether the holding in Deck should be extended to nonjury 
proceedings. 
A. English Common Law Shackling Background Applied to 
Nonjury Proceedings 
The Supreme Court in Deck interpreted Blackstone’s 
Commentaries as making a distinction between shackling during a trial 
and shackling during an arraignment.113 The Court, using Blackstone 
as support, noted that the rule against the unwarranted use of shackles 
applies only when the defendant appears at a jury trial; defendants 
have no similar protection against restraints during an arraignment 
hearing or other proceedings solely in front of the judge.114 In addition, 
the Court emphasized that the English common law rule was primarily 
designed to prevent defendants from experiencing the distracting pain 
caused by heavy iron restraints commonly used in the eighteenth 
century.115 
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, however, 
does not support but in fact rebuts the Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of early English common law practices in Deck. The Court in Deck reads 
Blackstone’s Commentaries as making the distinction between shackles 
at the time of trial and at the time of arraignment because Blackstone, 
after stating the general prohibition against shackles, noted: “But yet 
in Layer’s case . . . a difference was taken between the time of 
 
BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, at 317)); see also Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d at 663 (noting that “[t]he 
Supreme Court in Deck found that the common law drew a distinction between trial and pretrial 
proceedings” in regard to the prohibition against unwarranted shackles). 
 113. Deck, 544 U.S. at 626. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See id. at 630 (stating that “[j]udicial hostility to shackling . . . primarily . . . reflected 
concern for the suffering” the restraints caused, citing as authority English case law prohibiting 
the use of restraints); id. at 638–39 (Thomas J., dissenting) (stating that the English common law 
rule “ensured that a defendant was not so distracted by physical pain during his trial that he could 
not defend himself”). 
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arraignment, and the time of trial; and accordingly the prisoner stood 
at the bar in chains during the time of his arraignment.”116 Blackstone 
introduces Layer’s Case, however, not as establishing a firm rule that 
existed in early English common law, but rather as an exception to the 
general rule that defendants ought not be shackled in the courtroom.117 
In addition, the rule against unwarranted shackles appears in the 
chapter of Commentaries labeled “Of Arraignment, and it’s 
Incidents.”118 This heavily undermines the Court’s statement in Deck 
that “Blackstone and other English authorities recognized that the rule 
[against unwarranted shackling] did not apply at ‘the time of 
arraignment,’ ” since Blackstone chose to place that rule in the chapter 
on arraignment.119 
Further, the assertion in Deck that the prohibition against 
unwarranted shackles in early English common law was primarily 
implemented to avoid causing defendants pain may have also been 
misguided. Indeed, preventing defendants from enduring unnecessary 
pain served as one reason to limit the use of restraints in early English 
common law.120 But the rule was also enforced to achieve several other 
ends: to guarantee defendants a fair trial; to prevent punishment before 
conviction; to allow defendants to meaningfully participate in their own 
defense; to remove the distraction of shackles; and to maintain the 
dignity of the court.121 
B. The Legal Principles Supporting Deck Applied to 
Nonjury Proceedings 
Although the Supreme Court in Deck ruled on the 
constitutionality of indiscriminate shackling at the sentencing phase in 
particular, the Court’s reasoning applies with equal force to nonjury 
proceedings. In Deck, the Court held that the right of a defendant to be 
free from indiscriminate shackling protects three fundamental legal 
principles: (1) the presumption that the defendant is innocent until 
proven guilty, (2) the right to secure a meaningful defense, and (3) the 
dignity and decorum of the courtroom and the judicial process.122 The 
Court held in Deck that an indiscriminate shackling policy breached 
 
 116. See id. at 626 (majority opinion); 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, at 317. 
 117. The use of “[b]ut yet” supports the interpretation that Layer’s Case was the exception, 
not the rule, in early English common law cases. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, at 317. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See Deck, 544 U.S. at 626; 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, at 317. 
 120. See Mondelli, supra note 26, at 786. 
 121. Id. 
 122. 544 U.S. at 630–32 (reasoning that the unwarranted shackling of defendants in the 
sentencing phase of a trial contravenes the three listed legal principles). 
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these legal principles such that there must be a showing of an essential 
“state interest” in using shackles in a jury proceeding to avoid a due 
process violation.123 These legal principles apply with equal force when 
the court indiscriminately shackles defendants during a nonjury 
proceeding, so the Deck rule should be expanded to require 
individualized need before a defendant can be shackled in a nonjury 
proceeding. 
1. Presumption of Innocence 
The maxim that a criminal defendant is “innocent until proven 
guilty” is one of the most sacred principles of the American criminal 
justice system.124 But a disparity exists between the ideal of that legal 
principle and the “lived experiences of many suspected criminals in the 
United States.”125 Defendants in pretrial nonjury proceedings are 
routinely required to wear full restraints, consisting of handcuffs, a 
belly chain, and leg irons—and the use of such restraints conveys the 
message that defendants are dangerous, threatening, and aggressive. 
In other words, the restraints betray the ideal that defendants are 
presumed “innocent.” 
In Deck, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of 
shackling a defendant during the sentencing phase of the trial when a 
jury was present.126 Accordingly, in analyzing the case, the Court 
focused on the prejudicial effect of the shackles on the jurors’ minds.127 
The Court stated that visible restraints weaken the presumption that 
the defendant is innocent until proven guilty because the shackles 
express to the jurors that “the justice system itself sees a ‘need to 
 
 123. Id. at 629 (“[T]he Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the use of physical 
restraints visible to the jury absent a trial court determination, in the exercise of its discretion, 
that they are justified by a state interest specific to a particular trial.”). 
 124. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 420 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Our 
society has a high degree of confidence in its criminal trials, in no small part because the 
Constitution offers unparalleled protections against convicting the innocent.”); Coffin v. United 
States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (“The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor 
of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the 
foundation of the administration of our criminal law.”).  
 125. Case Comment, Ninth Circuit Deems Unconstitutional Routine Shackling in Pretrial 
Proceedings: United States v. Gomez, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1163, 1163 (2018); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 
441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979) (stating that the legal principle of “presumption of innocence” does not 
apply to the treatment of pretrial defendants). 
 126. 544 U.S. at 625 (describing that during the retrial of the sentencing hearing, the 
defendant was required to wear full restraints in view of the jury). 
 127. Id. at 634–35.  
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separate a defendant from the community at large.’ ”128 The Court 
further noted that the appearance of a defendant in shackles “almost 
inevitably affects adversely the jury’s perception of the character of the 
defendant,” which compromises a jury’s “ability to weigh accurately all 
relevant considerations.”129 
The practice of unwarranted shackling, however, offends the 
presumption of innocence regardless of whether a jury is present. The 
concerns regarding bias that the Court described in Deck apply to 
nonjury proceedings as well, as judges are not wholly immune from 
exhibiting bias in the courtroom. Indeed, viewing defendants in 
shackles may cause judges to exhibit prejudice, even if 
unintentionally.130 Studies have shown that judges tend to overestimate 
their own resistance to prejudice,131 which as a result makes them more 
susceptible to act based on implicit biases.132 One such form of implicit 
bias—“representativeness bias”—refers to the tendency to assume that 
a person’s character aligns with his appearance.133 Judges therefore 
may be more likely to infer that defendants in restraints are dangerous 
and a threat to the public, which could in turn cause judges to issue 
biased decisions. 
There has not yet been sufficient investigation into whether and 
to what extent judges specifically are biased by the use of restraints in 
 
 128. Id. at 630 (quoting Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 569 (1986)); see also Mondelli, supra 
note 26, at 794 (“The Court [in Deck] focused on the need for accurate decisions to be made by the 
jury, arguing the decision making process is compromised if a jury sees a defendant in shackles.”). 
 129. Deck, 544 U.S. at 633; see also Sheldon R. Shapiro, Annotation, Propriety and Prejudicial 
Effect of Gagging, Shackling, or Otherwise Physically Restraining Accused During Course of State 
Criminal Trial, 90 A.L.R. 3d Art. 17, § (2)(a) (1979). 
 130. See People v. Best, 979 N.E.2d 1187, 1190 (N.Y. 2012) (Lippman, C.J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the assumption that judges are immune from prejudice “is to degrade a defendant’s 
right to be presumed innocent. Visible shackles give the impression to any trier of fact that a 
person is violent, a miscreant, and cannot be trusted.”); cf. MICHAEL D. CICCHINI, TRIED AND 
CONVICTED: HOW POLICE, PROSECUTORS, AND JUDGES DESTROY OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 96–
102 (2012) (describing a case in which a judge showed clear indications of bias); Donald C. Nugent, 
Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 49 (1994) (“[M]any judges are slow to accept the possibility 
of bias in their own decision-making, viewing the existence of partiality as improbable instead of 
as an inherent aspect of the human perceptual process.”). 
 131. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1225–26 (2009) (describing a study in which ninety percent of judges 
considered themselves to be in the top half of all judges in resisting bias). 
 132. See Fatma E. Marouf, The Unconstitutional Use of Restraints in Removal Proceedings, 67 
BAYLOR L. REV. 214, 269 (2015) (citing Eric Luis Uhlmann & Geoffrey L. Cohen, “I Think It, 
Therefore It’s True”: Effects of Self-Perceived Objectivity on Hiring Discrimination, 104 ORG. 
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 207, 210–11 (2007)). 
 133. Brief for National Ass’n of Federal Defenders as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532 (2018) (No. 17-312), 2018 WL 1156630, at *13 
(citing Marouf, supra note 132, at 268–69).  
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the courtroom.134 However, a 2015 study by Magistrate Judge Andrew 
Wistrich and law professors Jeffrey J. Rachlinski and Chris Guthrie 
indicated that judges are swayed by their emotions when evaluating 
cases.135 The study required judges to respond to hypothetical cases,136 
and the results revealed that the judges were influenced by legally 
insignificant circumstantial factors and the personal characteristics of 
the fictional litigants.137 The study acknowledged that “judges may be 
less susceptible than jurors” to bias but stated that judges “are not 
immune” from exhibiting prejudice in the courtroom.138 Additional 
studies on judicial bias also confirm that judges’ emotions may affect 
the outcome of proceedings.139 
Wistrich’s 2015 study examined how judges react to 
circumstantial differences in cases rather than how judges react to the 
physical appearance of the defendants they confront.140 Thus, Wistrich’s 
study does not directly relate to shackling.141 Nevertheless, the study 
does reveal that “judges are comparable to jurors in that both are 
susceptible to influence from external factors.”142 Neither judges nor 
jurors, research shows, can act wholly dispassionately in the courtroom. 
And if judges are susceptible to prejudice in the courtroom, “judges may 
also be influenced by the same external factors that affect jurors—
including shackles.”143 
While many—if not most—judges are fair and impartial, some 
judges likely are not capable of disregarding their biases completely 
when viewing defendants in shackles. For that reason, the Deck rule 
should not hinge on the presence of a jury. Although the Court in Deck 
focused its discussion on juror bias specifically, the Court’s rationale in 
prohibiting the unwarranted use of shackles hinged on the Court’s 
 
 134. Neusha Etemad, Note, To Shackle or Not to Shackle? The Effect of Shackling on Judicial 
Decision-Making, 28 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 349, 374 (2019). 
 135. Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Heart Versus Head: Do Judges Follow the Law or Follow Their 
Feelings?, 93 TEX. L. REV. 855, 900 (2015). 
 136. Id. at 874, 913–22. The hypothetical cases used in the study involved (1) illegal 
immigration, (2) medical marijuana, (3) a civil rights claim, (4) credit card debt, (5) an employment 
case involving a narcotics search, and (6) environmental pollution. See id. at 913–22. 
 137. Id. at 898–900 (indicating that judges were less likely to interpret the law favorably and 
more likely to rule against defendants considered to be “unsympathetic”); see also Etemad, Note, 
supra note 134, at 364–67 (discussing the results of the Wistrich study). 
 138. Wistrich et al., supra note 135, at 900.  
 139. See Holger Spamann & Lars Klöhn, Justice is Blind, and Less Legalistic, than We 
Thought: Evidence from an Experiment with Real Judges, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 255, 256 (2016) 
(detailing a study in which judges were shown to disfavor unsympathetic litigants in a statutory 
interpretation issue). 
 140. Wistrich et al., supra note 135, at 900.  
 141. Id. 
 142. Etemad, Note, supra note 134, at 368 (citing Wistrich et al., supra note 135, at 900). 
 143. Id. at 377. 
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concern over bias in the courtroom generally.144 The Court expressed 
concern over the prejudicial effect of shackles, and eliminating such 
prejudice requires eliminating unwarranted restraints in jury and 
nonjury proceedings. “[I]n a system in which every person is presumed 
innocent until proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the Due 
Process Clause forbids toleration of the risk” that bias, from a jury or 
from a judge, could unduly influence the result of a courtroom 
proceeding.145 
Moreover, while the presumption of innocence furthers the 
impartiality of the factfinding process at trial,146 it also operates as a 
“normative principle, directing state authorities as to the proper way of 
treating a person who has not yet been convicted.”147 This function of 
the presumption of innocence arises from its ties to the Due Process 
Clause,148 which has often been interpreted as safeguarding equality 
and fairness.149 Thus, interpreted in light of due process, the 
presumption of innocence functions to preserve individual liberties and 
minimize the stigma placed on criminal defendants—purposes that are 
not dependent on the presence of a jury.150 
Shackling criminal defendants degrades the presumption of 
innocence by subjecting criminal defendants to unwarranted 
oppression, public shame, and embarrassment.151 These “harms and 
indignities having nothing to do with the presence of a jury . . . formed 
the substance of the common-law rule,” while the concern for juror 
 
 144. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 630 (2005) (noting a shift in debate from the pain of 
shackles to other general legal principles). 
 145. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 518–19 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (agreeing with 
the Court’s holding that forcing the defendant to wear prison attire violated the defendant’s due 
process rights, but dissenting from the holding that the defendant’s failure to object to the prison 
attire negates the violation). 
 146. See William S. Laufer, The Rhetoric of Innocence, 70 WASH. L. REV. 329, 404 (1995) 
(stating that “[t]he presumption of innocence should operate as both an evidentiary restriction and 
a constraint on partiality, deriving its meaning and authority from the right to a fair trial, as well 
as the right to trial by an impartial jury”). 
 147. Rinat Kitai, Presuming Innocence, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 257, 272 (2002). 
 148. See Estelle, 425 U.S. at 517 (“One of the essential due process safeguards that attends the 
accused at his trial is the benefit of the presumption of innocence . . . .”). 
 149. See Brief for National Ass’n of Federal Defenders, supra note 133, at *23 n.21; Laufer, 
supra note 146, at 353. 
 150. See Laufer, supra note 146, at 353. 
 151. See Anita Nabha, Shuffling to Justice: Why Children Should Not Be Shackled in Court, 
73 BROOK. L. REV. 1549, 1578 (2008) (stating that shackles “cause embarrassment and shame” and 
exacerbate negative feelings in juveniles accused of a crime). Although Nabha’s article focuses on 
the effect of shackles on juvenile delinquents, the principles apply to defendants of all ages. In fact, 
Nabha states that the use of shackles as a punitive measure “has no place in the adult criminal 
system prior to the determination of guilt” as well. Id. at 1574 n.155. 
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prejudice emerged as a “relatively recent American addition.”152 
Indiscriminate shackling erodes the presumption of innocence even 
when the proceeding contains no jury, so the reasoning in Deck cannot 
be limited to the phases of a trial where jurors are present. 
In fact, the presumption of innocence may be more offended by 
shackling in a nonjury, pretrial proceeding than in the penalty phase of 
a trial. In Deck, the Court ruled that requiring the defendant to wear 
shackles in a postconviction sentencing hearing eroded the presumption 
of innocence.153 Thus, if the Court believes that trial courts cannot 
routinely force defendants to wear shackles after a court has convicted 
them of a crime, then the prohibition against the use of unwarranted 
shackles should extend to pretrial proceedings as well, where a 
defendant comes to the court as an “innocent.”154 
2. Right to Secure a Meaningful Defense 
The Supreme Court in Deck held that indiscriminate shackling 
in the penalty phase of trial also impairs the defendant’s right to 
counsel and to secure a meaningful defense.155 The Court stressed that 
shackling diminishes the defendant’s right to secure a meaningful 
defense in the guilt phase of trial because the restraints “interfere with 
the accused’s ‘ability to communicate’ with his lawyer”156 and restricts 
the defendant’s ability to engage in his own defense.157 The Court then 
reasoned that such concerns were equally important in the sentencing 
phase of a criminal trial.158 But the constitutional right to secure a 
meaningful defense through effective assistance of counsel does not 
 
 152. Brief for National Ass’n of Federal Defenders, supra note 133, at *12 (citing Joan M. 
Krauskopf, Physical Restraint of the Defendant in the Courtroom, 15 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 351, 355 
(1971)).  
 153. See Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 633 (2005) (holding that courts cannot routinely force 
defendants to wear shackles during the penalty phase of a trial). 
 154. See David R. Wallis, Note, Visibly Shackled: The Supreme Court’s Failure to Distinguish 
Between Convicted and Accused at Sentencing for Capital Crimes, 71 MO. L. REV. 447, 467 (2006) 
(“[T]he jury, by finding the defendant guilty, has essentially already recommended that the 
defendant be removed from the community at large. It is complete fiction to suggest that a 
defendant who has just been found guilty by a jury somehow retains any degree of innocence.”). 
 155. 544 U.S. at 631; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”); Powell v. Alabama, 
287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932) (“[The defendant] requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the 
proceedings against him.” (emphasis added)).  
 156. Deck, 544 U.S. at 631 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970)). 
 157. Id. (“[Shackles] can interfere with a defendant’s ability to participate in his own defense, 
say, by freely choosing whether to take the witness stand on his own behalf.”).  
 158. Id. at 632. 
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depend on the presence of a jury.159 Indeed, in Lafler v. Cooper, the 
Supreme Court held that the “constitutional guarantee” of effective 
assistance of counsel applies to pretrial proceedings and noted that 
during such proceedings, “defendants cannot be presumed to make 
critical decisions without counsel’s advice.”160 Put differently, 
defendants have the right to seek guidance from counsel and to 
participate unhindered in their own defense, regardless of whether a 
jury is present.161 Shackling a defendant hinders his ability to 
communicate effectively with counsel and participate in his defense, 
and therefore the Supreme Court should extend the rule established in 
Deck to nonjury proceedings. 
3. Dignity and Decorum of the Courtroom 
Lastly, the Supreme Court in Deck declared that indiscriminate 
shackling of defendants during the sentencing phase of trial violates 
the dignity and decorum of the courtroom. The Court in Deck noted that 
“judges must seek to maintain a judicial process that is a dignified 
process,” which includes the “respectful treatment” of defendants.162 
The Court then concluded that the indiscriminate use of shackles on 
defendants “in the presence of juries” would undercut such objectives.163 
However, in reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on its prior 
decision in Illinois v. Allen, where the Court labeled shackling “an 
affront” to the “dignity and decorum of judicial proceedings.”164 The 
Court in Allen, unlike the Court in Deck, did not base its decision on the 
presence of a jury.165 Deck therefore adopted a narrower version of the 
proposition in Allen, although Deck does not question or overrule the 
 
 159. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 165 (2012); see Spain v. Rushen, 883 F.2d 712, 719, 728 
(9th Cir. 1989) (holding that the defendant’s due process rights were violated because he was forced 
to wear twenty-five pounds of leg irons, chains, and shackles to pretrial and trial proceedings, 
which caused him pain and humiliation and “prevented him from meaningfully participating in 
aiding his counsel” in his defense). 
 160. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 165. 
 161. Id.  
 162. 544 U.S. at 631–32. 
 163. Id. 
 164. 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970); see Deck, 544 U.S. at 631 (quoting Allen, 397 U.S. at 344, in 
support of the proposition that the “routine use of shackles in the presence of juries would 
undermine” the dignity and decorum of the courtroom). 
 165. Allen, 397 U.S. at 343 (“It is essential to the proper administration of criminal justice that 
dignity, order, and decorum be the hallmarks of all court proceedings in our country.” (emphasis 
added)); see also People v. Fierro, 821 P.2d 1302, 1320–23 (Cal. 1991). In Fierro, the court reasoned 
that a rule against the unwarranted use of shackles “maintain[s] the composure and dignity of the 
individual accused” and “preserve[s] respect for the judicial system as a whole.” Id. at 1322. The 
court in Fierro then further emphasized those are “paramount values to be preserved irrespective 
of whether a jury is present during the proceeding.” Id. 
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broader reasoning.166 Instead, the Court in Deck likely limited the 
proposition to fit the facts at issue in the case, which involved a 
defendant who was shackled during the sentencing phase of his trial in 
the presence of jurors.167 
Forcing defendants to wear heavy shackles absent a compelling 
interest undermines the dignity and decorum of the judicial process 
regardless of who witnesses the practice. “The fact that the proceeding 
is non-jury does not diminish the degradation a prisoner suffers when 
needlessly paraded about a courtroom, like a dancing bear on a lead, 
wearing belly chains and manacles.”168 Defendants must be treated 
with respect throughout all phases of a trial to maintain the dignity and 
decorum of the courtroom, whether in a pretrial proceeding, the guilt 
phase, or a sentencing hearing, and whether or not a jury is present. 
C. Circuit Split Over Deck as Applied to Nonjury Proceedings 
As noted before, Deck v. Missouri held that the Constitution 
prohibits shackling a defendant in the sentencing phase of a trial absent 
an individualized determination that restraints are justified by an 
essential state interest. This ruling expanded prior prohibitions on 
shackles that applied only in the guilt phase of trial.169 The Supreme 
Court in Deck, however, did not dismiss the possibility of expanding the 
prohibition to all proceedings, and thus whether the Constitution 
prohibits the unwarranted use of shackles in proceedings without a jury 
remains unanswered. In fact, a circuit split has arisen over whether 
Deck should be extended to nonjury proceedings.170 The U.S. Courts of 
Appeals for the Second and Eleventh Circuits have determined that 
 
 166. Allen, 397 U.S. at 344.  
 167. 544 U.S. at 624–25. 
 168. United States v. Zuber, 118 F.3d 101, 106 (2d Cir. 1997) (Cardamone, J., concurring). 
Judge Cardamone joined the majority in Zuber because he agreed that the error in the particular 
case at issue was harmless. Id. at 105. He wrote separately, however, to assert his “strong 
conviction that before a defendant is subjected to the humiliating prospect of pleading his case in 
chains, a trial judge must make an inquiry regarding the necessity for the restraints—even if no 
jury is present.” Id.  
 169. Deck, 544 U.S. at 624 (quoting Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568–69 (1986)); see U.S. 
CONST. amend. V (establishing the right of due process under the law for those accused of a crime). 
 170. The Courts of Appeals involved in the circuit split at issue here are the Second Circuit, 
Ninth Circuit, and Eleventh Circuit. These are the only Courts of Appeals to directly rule on 
shackling defendants during nonjury proceedings and therefore this Note focuses specifically on 
these three circuits. The Seventh Circuit confronted the constitutionality of shackling defendants 
in nonjury proceedings in United States v. Henderson, but dismissed the case on jurisdictional 
grounds, and therefore failed to decide the issue. 915 F.3d 1127, 1133 (2019). In dissent, however, 
Judge David F. Hamilton advocated for adoption of the Ninth Circuit’s approach. Id. at 1141 
(Hamilton, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Seventh Circuit should “require individualized 
decision-making before a district court may impose full restraints in the courtroom on pretrial 
defendants who are still presumed innocent.”).  
Shourd_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 3/13/2020  2:24 PM 
558 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:2:535 
courts may restrain defendants in nonjury proceedings without 
showing an individualized need.171 These circuits reason that, in 
nonjury proceedings, defendants do not require protection from 
unwarranted shackling. Conversely, in United States v. Sanchez-
Gomez, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the 
Constitution prohibits the shackling of a defendant absent an 
individual inquiry into the necessity of restraints, regardless of whether 
jurors are present.172 
1. The Second and Eleventh Circuit Approach 
The Second and Eleventh Circuits have held that courts may, 
consistent with the Due Process Clause, use shackles in nonjury 
proceedings without a showing of individualized need.173 In United 
States v. Zuber, for instance, the Second Circuit held that in nonjury 
proceedings, courts are not required to independently evaluate the need 
for restraints before shackling defendants.174 In Zuber, the U.S. 
Marshals Service decided as a matter of course to force Zuber to attend 
his sentencing hearing in arm and leg restraints.175 Zuber’s counsel 
unsuccessfully protested the restraints, and Zuber was sentenced to 151 
months in prison.176 Zuber appealed this sentence, arguing that the 
district court erred in “deferring to the recommendation of the Marshals 
Service that the defendant be restrained.”177 The Second Circuit 
disagreed, however, holding that the district court was not in error.178 
The Second Circuit stressed that the limitations on the use of shackles 
in the courtroom operate primarily to prevent juror bias, and because 
“judges, unlike juries, are not prejudiced by impermissible factors,” 
safeguards on the use of shackles are unnecessary when the jury is not 
present.179 
 
 171. See United States v. LaFond, 783 F.3d 1216, 1225 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that the 
Constitution does not prohibit the shackling of a defendant during a sentencing hearing before a 
judge); Zuber, 118 F.3d at 104 (“We decline to extend the rule . . . requiring an independent, 
judicial evaluation of the need to restrain a party in court [ ] to the context of non-jury sentencing 
proceedings.”). 
 172. 859 F.3d 649, 666 (9th Cir. 2017), vacated as moot, 138 S. Ct. 1532 (2018). 
 173. See LaFond, 783 F.3d at 1225; Zuber, 118 F.3d at 104. 
 174. 118 F.3d at 102 (“We hold that the rule that courts may not permit a party to a jury trial 
to appear in court in physical restraints without first conducting an independent evaluation of the 
need for these restraints does not apply in the context of a non-jury sentencing hearing.”). 
 175. Id. at 103 (“The decision to have [the defendant] appear in restraints was made in the 
normal course by the U.S. Marshals Service.”). 
 176. Id.  
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 103–04 (stating that “juror bias certainly constitutes the paramount concern” in 
cases dealing with the permissibility of shackling criminal defendants). 
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The Second Circuit decided Zuber in 1997, eight years before 
Deck v. Missouri, leaving the court with no authoritative Supreme 
Court precedent to guide its analysis.180 However, the Second Circuit 
decided Zuber in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Illinois v. Allen,181 and Deck ultimately adopted the rationale outlined 
in Allen.182 The Court’s comments on shackling in Allen are dicta and, 
as a result, were not binding on the Second Circuit in Zuber.183 But 
Allen demonstrates both the Supreme Court’s concerns with 
unwarranted shackling and its skepticism over the practice’s 
constitutionality.184 The Second Circuit thus should have afforded the 
case more deference. Instead, the Second Circuit addressed—but then 
quickly disregarded—the fact that unwarranted shackling of criminal 
defendants undermines the right to a meaningful defense and the 
dignity and decorum of the courtroom.185 This creates detrimental, 
humiliating, and injurious effects on defendants whether or not a jury 
is present.186 
The Eleventh Circuit reached a similar result in United States 
v. LaFond, where it held that the rule against shackling a defendant 
without justification does not apply to nonjury sentencing hearings.187 
The defendant in LaFond argued that the district court abused its 
discretion when it mandated that he remain shackled throughout his 
 
 180. As previously mentioned, there are three fundamental Supreme Court cases prior to Deck 
that consider the practice of shackling criminal defendants. See Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 
(1986); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970). Deck, 
however, was the first Supreme Court case to rule on the constitutionality of shackling defendants 
directly. 544 U.S. 622, 632 (2005). Furthermore, the Second Circuit has not ruled on the 
constitutionality of indiscriminate shackling in nonjury proceedings since Zuber in 1997.  
 181. 397 U.S. at 344 (explaining that the use of restraints prejudices the jury against the 
defendant, significantly reduces the defendant’s ability to participate meaningfully in his defense, 
and “affront[s] . . .  the . . . dignity and decorum” of the courtroom). 
 182. Deck, 544 U.S. at 630–32 (discussing the importance of dignity in the courtroom and citing 
Allen for the proposition that shackling is an “affront” to this dignity). 
 183. Allen, 397 U.S. at 344.  
 184. Deck confirmed the importance of Allen. See Deck, 544 U.S. at 630–32; Allen, 397 U.S. at 
344. Deck heavily cites Allen to support its holding; it also relies on Allen’s explanation of the legal 
principles violated by indiscriminate shackling. Deck, 544 U.S. at 630–32. 
 185. Zuber, 118 F.3d at 103 n.2. 
 186. Id. at 105–06 (Cardamone, J., concurring): 
Physical restraints detract from the dignity and decorum of court proceedings, and on 
that basis alone are disfavored. Restraints may also substantially interfere with the 
accused’s ability to present his case—by impeding easy communication with counsel, 
confusing a defendant to a degree sufficient to impair his mental faculties, and causing 
the prisoner to suffer pain. These concerns are implicated regardless of whether a jury 
is witness to the physical restraints placed on a defendant. 
(citations omitted).  
 187. 783 F.3d 1216, 1225 (11th Cir. 2015). 
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sentencing hearing.188 The defendant argued that, although no jurors 
were present, the restraints caused him to suffer an “indignity” that 
“his conduct did not merit” and prevented him from writing during the 
hearing.189 The defendant further contended that shackles are 
“inherently prejudicial” and should not be used on defendants absent 
necessity.190 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, however: because the 
defendant appeared in shackles before only a judge, and not a jury, he 
had no protection against indiscriminate shackling.191 
The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion was misguided. Although the 
Eleventh Circuit decided LaFond ten years after the Supreme Court 
decided Deck, the former disregards the legal principles outlined in the 
latter. The Eleventh Circuit failed to mention the effect that shackling 
has on a defendant’s right to a meaningful defense and the “dignity and 
decorum” of the courtroom and scarcely mentioned the implications 
that indiscriminate shackling has on the presumption of innocence.192 
Although the Supreme Court relies heavily on these principles in Deck, 
the Eleventh Circuit in LaFond, without explanation, did not analyze 
the application of those principles to the case; indeed, it did not even 
mention them.193 Instead, the Eleventh Circuit incorrectly relied on 
ancient English common law to conclude that defendants may be 
shackled indiscriminately during nonjury proceedings.194 
The Eleventh Circuit should have given greater weight to the 
Supreme Court’s analysis in Deck and applied the legal principles 
outlined there to LaFond.195 In fact, since the defendant in LaFond 
claimed that the heavy restraints prevented him from writing during 
the hearing and were “inherently prejudicial,” the court should have 
applied Deck’s three legal principles and ruled that the shackles in that 
case were unconstitutional.196 
 
 188. Id.  
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. (“Because the rule against shackling pertains only to a jury trial, we hold that it does 
not apply to a sentencing hearing before a district judge.”). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. (citing 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, and a 1722 English court opinion as support for 
the proposition that unwarranted shackling is permissible during nonjury proceedings); see also 4 
BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, at 317 (providing historic precedent that while a defendant did not 
stand in chains during trial, he did so during arraignment); Trial of Christopher Layer, 16 How. 
St. Tr. 94, 100–01 (K.B. 1722) (providing an example of the distinction between shackling at trial 
and at arraignment). 
 195. See Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 630–32 (2005) (analyzing the detriments of shackling 
during the punishment phase of a capital trial). 
 196. LaFond, 783 F.3d at 1225. 
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2. The Ninth Circuit Approach 
Taking a different approach, the Ninth Circuit held in United 
States v. Sanchez-Gomez that the rule prohibiting the unwarranted 
shackling of criminal defendants established in Deck v. Missouri applies 
to nonjury proceedings as well.197 The Ninth Circuit wrote that “[b]efore 
a presumptively innocent defendant may be shackled, the court must 
make an individualized decision that a compelling government purpose 
would be served and that shackles are the least restrictive means for 
maintaining security and order in the courtroom.”198 The court held that 
the constitutional safeguards against shackling apply to all courtroom 
proceedings—jury or no jury.199 
Sanchez-Gomez involved a courtroom policy adopted by the U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of California that permitted the 
indiscriminate shackling of “all in-custody defendants” for nonjury 
proceedings.200 As part of the district-wide policy, restraints were used 
uniformly on defendants, regardless of their individual 
characteristics.201 As a result, the court used full restraints on, among 
others, a defendant with a fractured wrist, a defendant with a cane, and 
a defendant in a wheelchair.202 In Sanchez-Gomez, four defendants had 
been forced over their objections to wear shackles in the courtroom.203 
Magistrate judges overruled the defendants’ objections; these decisions 
were then appealed to the district court.204 The defendants also filed an 
emergency motion to challenge the constitutionality of the court’s 
shackling policy, claiming that the policy violated their Fifth 
Amendment due process rights.205 However, the district court disagreed 
and denied relief for the defendants.206 The defendants appealed, and 
the Ninth Circuit consolidated the four cases.207 
 
 197. United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d 649, 660 (9th Cir. 2017), vacated as moot, 138 
S. Ct. 1532 (2018). 
 198. Id. at 661. As an example, the interest in courtroom security and interest in preventing 
escape are “compelling government purpose[s].” Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 653. 
 201. The policy in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California 
called for the use of “full restraints” for “all” defendants in nonjury proceedings, which meant that 
each defendant had to wear handcuffs tied closely together, a waist chain, and additional shackles 
chaining the defendant’s feet together. Id. at 653–54. 
 202. Id. at 654. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
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In deciding the case, the Ninth Circuit relied on its decision in 
United States v. Howard, a holding that the court characterized as 
requiring “adequate justification for a generalized policy authorizing 
the pretrial use of shackles.”208 The Ninth Circuit in Howard upheld a 
district-wide policy requiring pretrial detainees to wear leg shackles the 
first time they appeared before a magistrate judge, claiming the policy 
was sufficiently justified.209 The court in Howard relied on declarations 
from the Chief Deputy U.S. Marshal for the Central District of 
California in upholding the policy.210 The Chief Deputy declared that a 
generalized shackling policy was necessary to ensure order and safety 
in the courtroom in light of staffing shortages in the Marshals 
Service.211 In addition, he noted that “the greatest risks of escape and 
violence occur during transportation from detention facilities and in the 
courtroom,” which supports the need for indiscriminate pretrial 
restraints.212 In light of Howard, the Ninth Circuit remanded Sanchez-
Gomez for a determination of whether an “adequate justification” 
existed for the indiscriminate shackling policy at issue in that case.213 
In so doing, the court dodged the question of whether an indiscriminate 
shackling policy violates the Due Process Clause. 
Soon after, however, the circuit voted to rehear the case en 
banc.214 The en banc court overruled Howard and held that “if the 
government seeks to shackle a defendant, it must first justify the 
infringement with specific security needs as to that particular 
defendant.”215 Courts must then determine if the stated need 
“outweighs the infringement on a defendant’s right” to be free of 
unwarranted restraints.216 The Ninth Circuit stated that courts cannot 
 
 208. United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 798 F.3d 1204, 1206 (9th Cir. 2015); see also United 
States v. Howard, 480 F.3d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 2007) (upholding the shackling policy because it 
“was adopted with an adequate justification of its necessity”), overruled by Sanchez-Gomez, 859 
F.3d at 661 n.10. 
 209. 480 F.3d at 1008. 
 210. Id. at 1008–09. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 1009. 
 213. Sanchez-Gomez, 798 F.3d at 1206; see also Howard, 480 F.3d at 1008 (establishing the 
“adequate justification” standard for cases like Sanchez-Gomez).  
 214. United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 831 F.3d 1263, 1264 (9th Cir. 2016) (mem.).  
 215. United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d 649, 666 (9th Cir. 2017), vacated as moot, 138 
S. Ct. 1532 (2018). The Ninth Circuit interpreted the defendant’s appeals as writs of mandamus. 
It denied the writ, but held that it had jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of the district-
wide shackling policy. Id. at 655–57, 666. At the time the Ninth Circuit voted to rehear the case, 
the four defendants’ cases had ended and the district-wide shackling policy had changed. Id. at 
657–59. The Ninth Circuit explained, however, that the case was not moot because the defendants 
represented a broader group of similarly situated people who could be similarly injured if the 
shackling policy was reinstated. Id. at 659. 
 216. Id. at 666. 
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defer such determinations to U.S. Marshals or other security 
providers.217 Moreover, the circuit asserted that courts must conduct 
individualized rulings on each defendant; the decision cannot be 
“presumptively answered by routine policies.”218 The circuit then 
emphasized that the Constitution’s right to be free from unwarranted 
restraints applies in all courtroom proceedings, whether or not a jury is 
present.219 
In reaching the holding in Sanchez-Gomez, the Ninth Circuit 
emphasized the deep common law roots prohibiting the use of physical 
restraints and soundly labeled the right to be free from unwarranted 
shackles a “fundamental right.”220 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit 
stressed that lower courts addressing claims of unwarranted shackling 
must consider concerns similar to those outlined by the Supreme Court 
in Deck v. Missouri, including “whether shackles would prejudice the 
jury, diminish the presumption of innocence, impair the defendant’s 
mental capabilities, interfere with the defendant’s ability to 
communicate with counsel, detract from the dignity and decorum of the 
courtroom or cause physical pain.”221 The Ninth Circuit recognized that 
such concerns do not hinge on the presence of a jury, and therefore must 
be safeguarded in equal force in nonjury proceedings.222 Courts must 
strive to protect the constitutional rights of defendants in jury and 
nonjury proceedings.223   
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to United States v. 
Sanchez-Gomez in December 2017 and vacated and remanded the case 
to the Ninth Circuit to dismiss as moot.224 In deciding to remand the 
case, however, the Supreme Court did not decide the constitutionality 
of an indiscriminate shackling policy in a nonjury proceeding, leaving 
it an open question.225 
III. SOLUTION 
The Supreme Court should adopt the Ninth Circuit’s approach 
and extend the holding in Deck v. Missouri to all courtroom 
 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at 662, 666. 
 221. Id. at 660. 
      222.  Id. 
      223.  Id. 
 224. United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532, 1542 (2018). This Note specifically 
focuses on the constitutionality of indiscriminate shackling, and thus will not engage in a detailed 
discussion of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in holding the case moot.  
 225. Id. 
Shourd_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 3/13/2020  2:24 PM 
564 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:2:535 
proceedings.226 Indiscriminately shackling defendants in nonjury 
proceedings is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s well-reasoned 
opinion in Deck,227 and defendants have a constitutional right to be free 
from the use of unjustified restraints irrespective of the presence of a 
jury. Thus, in both jury and nonjury proceedings, shackling defendants 
without a showing that an essential state interest necessitates the use 
of restraints violates the Due Process Clause. 
The principles that the Supreme Court advances in Deck apply 
with equal force to nonjury proceedings. While the Ninth Circuit in 
Sanchez-Gomez recognized this,228 the Second and Eleventh Circuits 
gave only cursory treatment to the rights of defendants in nonjury 
proceedings.229 Those circuits appear to assume incorrectly that the 
absence of a jury negates the defendant’s right to the presumption of 
innocence and to secure a meaningful defense, as well as the need to 
preserve the dignity and decorum of the courtroom. The Ninth Circuit’s 
position, on the other hand, preserves these fundamental legal 
principles and ensures that the constitutional rights of defendants are 
protected—jury or no jury.230 
The Ninth Circuit in Sanchez-Gomez, however, does not provide 
guidance on how courts should conduct the individualized shackling 
determinations or on the type of restraints that should be used in the 
event shackles are deemed justified.231 This Part will thus propose 
factors for courts to consider in the shackling analysis and offer further 
recommendations for the implementation of the Sanchez-Gomez rule.  
The following factors shall be considered by courts in 
implementing the rule against the unwarranted shackles during 
nonjury and jury proceedings: 
(1) [T]he seriousness of the present charge against the defendant, (2) the defendant’s 
temperament and character, (3) the defendant’s age and physical characteristics, (4) the 
defendant’s past record, (5) any past escapes or attempted escapes by the defendant, (6) 
 
 226. 544 U.S. 622, 624 (2005). 
 227. Id. 
 228. 859 F.3d at 660–62 (stating that the “Supreme Court identified three constitutional 
anchors for the right” to be free from unwarranted shackles, and applied those “constitutional 
anchors” to nonjury proceedings). 
 229. See United States v. LaFond, 783 F.3d 1216, 1225 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Because the rule 
against shackling pertains only to a jury trial, we hold that it does not apply to a sentencing 
hearing before a district judge.”); United States v. Zuber, 118 F.3d 101, 104 (2d Cir. 1997) (“We 
decline to extend the rule that we set forth in Davidson—requiring an independent, judicial 
evaluation of the need to restrain a party in court—to the context of non-jury sentencing 
proceedings.”). 
 230. See Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d at 661 (“We now clarify the scope of the right [to be free 
from unjustified restraints] and hold that it applies whether the proceeding is pretrial, trial, or 
sentencing, with a jury or without.”). 
 231. Id. at 666. 
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evidence of a present plan of escape by the defendant, (7) any threats by the defendant to 
harm others or create a disturbance, (8) evidence of self-destructive tendencies on the part 
of the defendant, (9) the risk of mob violence or of attempted revenge by others, (10) the 
possibility of rescue attempts by other offenders still at large, (11) the size and mood of 
the audience, (12) the nature and physical security of the courtroom, and (13) the 
adequacy and availability of alternative remedies.232 
These factors, adopted from an Illinois case involving a restraint 
determination,233 oblige judges to fully consider security concerns and 
order restraints when justified.234 This discredits the argument that 
expansion of the Deck rule threatens safety in the courtroom.235 
Furthermore, the factors require the judge to consider the defendant’s 
age, physical characteristics, and temperament, which mitigates the 
risk that the court will shackle defendants unnecessarily.236 The factors 
are not exhaustive; courts could choose to use the provided factors as a 
foundation from which to add additional relevant considerations.237  
In addition, if the court does make an individualized 
determination that shackles are warranted, the court must not default 
to ordering full restraints. Rather, the judge should impose the 
minimum amount of restraints necessary in the particular case to 
adequately address the security concerns. Examples of less restrictive 
alternatives to full restraints include partial restraints (e.g., one hand 
cuffed discreetly to a chair238) and the use of police officers or 
supplementary security personnel in the courtroom.239 
Critics of the Sanchez-Gomez opinion argue that expansion of 
the Deck rule to nonjury proceedings will cause administrative delay 
 
 232. People v. Allen, 856 N.E.2d 349, 353 (Ill. 2006); see also Leah Rabinowitz, Due Process 
Restrained: The Dual Dilemmas of Discriminate and Indiscriminate Shackling in Juvenile 
Delinquency Proceedings, 29 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 401, 422 (2009) (suggesting the Illinois factors 
should be at least considered while attempting to preserve dignity in juvenile proceedings that 
involve shackling). 
 233. Allen, 856 N.E.2d at 353. 
 234. See Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 628 (2005) (“[T]he right [to be free from shackles] may 
be overcome in a particular instance by essential state interests such as physical security, escape 
prevention, or courtroom decorum.”); Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 101, 110–11 (6th Cir. 1973) 
(stating that factors to be considered by trial courts in making shackling decisions include: (1) the 
defendant’s record, his temperament, and the desperateness of his situation; (2) the state of both 
the courtroom and the courthouse; (3) the defendant’s physical condition; and (4) whether there is 
a “less prejudicial but adequate” means of providing security). 
 235. See Brief of Amici Curiae Senator Jeff Flake et al. at 12, United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 
138 S. Ct. 1532 (2017) (No. 17-312), 2017 WL 4350725, at *12 (“The obvious effect of Sanchez-
Gomez, then, will be to require more officers to maintain an expected level of courtroom security 
over an ever-increasing number of prisoners with less certain safety for the public.”). 
 236. Allen, 856 N.E.2d at 353. 
 237. See Rabinowitz, supra note 232, at 422–23 (noting that states like California and Texas 
utilize separate, though similar, factors when determining the necessity of shackling). 
      238.  See Jones v. Meyer, 899 F.2d 883, 885 (9th Cir. 1990). 
      239.  See Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986)). 
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and hamper the efforts of law enforcement.240 However, courts already 
employ a similar shackling analysis in determining whether and how 
to use restraints on defendants during jury proceedings.241 Thus, it 
would not be an undue burden to require them also to make 
individualized shackling determinations during nonjury proceedings. 
In Deck, the Supreme Court noted that the decision to shackle 
defendants in the courtroom traditionally requires an individualized, 
nuanced evaluation of the circumstances that may “take into account 
the factors that courts have traditionally relied on in gauging potential 
security problems and the risk of escape at trial.”242 Put differently, trial 
courts have abundant experience with making such determinations in 
jury proceedings, and the approach can easily be adapted for use at 
nonjury proceedings as well.243 
CONCLUSION 
The unwarranted use of shackles on defendants is 
unconstitutional under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments regardless of the presence of a jury. Thus, the 
Supreme Court should adopt the approach taken in the Ninth Circuit 
case United States v. Sanchez-Gomez and hold that courts may not 
shackle defendants in any courtroom proceeding absent an 
individualized determination that an essential state interest 
necessitates the use of the restraints.244 Shackling criminal defendants 
 
 240. See Brief of Amici Curiae Senator Jeff Flake et. al., supra note 235, at *10 (arguing that 
an expansion of the Deck rule to nonjury proceedings will force courtroom security officers to spend 
time on “layer upon layer of administrative functions and not on assessing and avoiding actual 
security concerns”). 
 241. See, e.g., Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 628–29 (2005) (explaining that one’s right to be 
free from shackles “may be overcome in a particular instance by essential state interests such as 
physical security, escape prevention, or courtroom decorum”); United States v. Haynes, 729 F.3d 
178, 190 (2d Cir. 2013) (explaining that in making shackling decisions in jury trials, “judges make 
an independent determination, on a case-by-case basis, whether the use of shackles is warranted” 
after taking into account security concerns); United States v. Durham, 287 F.3d 1297, 1304 (11th 
Cir. 2002) (asserting that in making shackling determinations, “[t]rial judges are to be accorded 
reasonable discretion to balance the interests involved and to decide which measures are necessary 
to ensure the security of the courtroom”); Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 749 (9th Cir. 1995) (“In 
all the cases in which shackling has been approved, there has also been evidence of disruptive 
courtroom behavior, attempts to escape from custody, assaults or attempted assaults while in 
custody, or a pattern of defiant behavior toward corrections officials and judicial authorities.”); 
Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 101, 111 (6th Cir. 1973) (“[O]nly upon a clear showing of necessity 
should shackles ever be employed.”). 
 242. Deck, 544 U.S. at 629.   
 243. Furthermore, requiring courts to balance the interests involved and make a 
determination of the necessity of shackles addresses the counterargument that there are no 
“procedural steps for how a . . . court may come to a constitutional conclusion that a purportedly 
dangerous defendant should be shackled.” Dickerson, supra note 58, at 781. 
 244. 859 F.3d 649, 666 (9th Cir. 2017), vacated as moot, 138 S. Ct. 1532 (2018). 
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for no reason other than the fact that they are criminal defendants is 
an affront to the presumption of innocence, the right to a meaningful 
defense, and the dignity and decorum of the judicial process as a whole. 
The Supreme Court should extend the holding in Deck v. Missouri to 
apply to all criminal proceedings, jury and nonjury. 
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